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Abstract: Conventional view holds that beliefs play an important role in the development of regulations but 
there is little evidence to support this claim. We use Comparative Q Methodology to systematically map out  and 
compare the beliefs of public officers in China and Italy, two countries with contrasting sets of institutions but 
have both adopted similar ideas about integrated water resource management. We find some similarities and 
differences in the beliefs of public officers in both countries. In particular, we find that in both countries beliefs 
on the regulation of water utilities are diverse and fragmented on issues such as ownership structure of water 
utilities, how water infrastructure development should be funded, and how tariffs should be regulated. Our 
findings have two implications for theory, methods and practice. First, the Q methodology is a useful tool for 
systematically mapping out the beliefs of regulators and managers. Second, systematically mapping out beliefs 
will help facilitate the development of an alternative regime of regulation such as negotiated rule making.  This 
alternative regime can provide substantial benefits such as more efficient rule making, more cost effective 
enforcement and compliance, and more equitable in terms of balancing the interests of stakeholders. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Beliefs play an important – albeit often neglected – role in the management and regulation of 
water utilities. For example, ideas on neo-liberal beliefs on water regulation that especially 
spread in the 1970‟s and 1980‟s resulted in widespread privatization and re-regulation of 
water utilities in many countries and regions in the world (Thatcher 1998, 2002). The natural 
monopoly characteristics of urban water supply has led to calls for water concessions to be 
subjected to regulation. Problems of water scarcity and the need for more efficient water 
management has led to calls for an integrated approach to water management. Water is a 
local public good and therefore is subject to local politics and beliefs. Water being essential 
to life has led to calls for the State to guarantee it as a basic human right and as such should 
not be left in the hands of the private sector. 
While there are no disagreements in the literature on the importance of beliefs and ideas in 
the design and enforcement of regulations, little has been done to more systematically study 
beliefs and ideas and how they matter. For example, there are divergent views on how water 
utilities are to be owned and regulated – ranging from pure public ownership on one hand to 
complete privatization on the other hand and some form of regulation in between. 
In Europe, there are wide ranging debates on a number of issues. For instance, how should 
water tariffs and other service conditions be set? How should water infrastructure 
development be financed (Guerrini et al. 2011; Marques and Berg 2011; Massarutto 2007; 
Romano et al. 2013)? What is the role of regulators, their degree of autonomy and the scope 
for negotiated rule making? It is understandable that European countries would  have 
divergent views on water utilities regulation given their different legal traditions, political 
ideologies, beliefs about the market and state, among others. Similarly, in China, we find 
widely divergent views among local officials about ownership and regulation of  water 
utilities in the context of diverse geographical, economic and social conditions in various 
provinces as a country with a vast territory and huge population. 
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What these two anecdotal examples from China and Europe suggests is that there is a need to 
more systematically map out and study how beliefs matter to the ownership, regulation and 
management of water utilities in particular and to regulation in general. Systematically 
mapping out beliefs will help facilitate the development of an alternative regime of regulation 
- negotiated rule making – which can provide substantial benefits to many developing 
countries in the form of more efficient rule making, more cost effective in terms of 
enforcement and compliance, more equitable in terms of balancing the interests of 
stakeholders and other benefits. 
In this paper, we introduce the use of the Comparative Q Methodology to systematically map 
out, compare and study the beliefs of public officers using data from water utilities in China 
and Italy. First, we want to investigate whether local public officers share any „hegemonic‟ 
view of water service provision or rather they hold conflicting perspectives. Second, we want 
to know whether these beliefs vary within a country and between countries with different 
political and institutional contexts. These questions are part of a bigger question  on 
regulatory theory on whether regulations eventually converge or diverge. 
The cohesiveness or fragmentation of beliefs on water utilities management are important 
because may have various repercussions on water service provision, including, for example, 
influence on the stability or change of present water regulatory regimes and water utilities 
management styles. The comparison between two different countries – namely, one from the 
European context, Italy, and one from a non-European context, China – also helps in 
understanding how ideas on water utilities management differ across institutional and cultural 
settings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section will review the literature on 
the role of ideas in the regulation and management of water utilities. Section three will 
illustrate the methodology followed in the study. Section four will present the results from the 
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analysis and section five will discuss the findings. Finally, section six will draw the 
conclusions and indicate venues for further research. 
 
 
2. The role of beliefs and ideas in the regulation of water utilities 
 
Various fields of social sciences hold diverse understandings of the role of beliefs and ideas 
as drivers of social and economic phenomena. Within economics, beliefs and ideas play an 
important role as foundational components of rational agents. When it comes to explaining 
the economic regulation of utilities, however, we find that beliefs and ideas have relatively 
little explanatory role. Public interest theories of regulation posit that benign regulators know 
what the interests of the society as a whole are (Pigou 1932; Posner 1974; Ogus 1994). 
Private (or capture) theories of regulation build on the assumption that the regulated industry 
or particular firms seek to maximize their material net benefits (Stigler 1971; Becker 1983; 
Peltzman 1989). These theories do not account for where beliefs and ideas come from, how 
they can change over time, and how change of beliefs and ideas result in reconfiguration of 
regulatory systems. Beliefs and ideas are mere „epiphenomena‟ with respect to the more 
fundamental drivers of choice based on material interests. 
In part of political science, beliefs and ideas play a relatively minor role as causal sources of 
policy stability and change with respect to structural and „configurational‟ explanations. Neo- 
institutionalist approaches, for example, grant large explanatory power to the distribution of 
individual stakes, to the resources that actors can leverage on, and on the relationships within 
networks of actors (Béland 2005; Klijn and Koppenjan 2004; Peters 2011; Weaver and 
Rockman 1993; Schmidt 2010, 2011). Some authors, however, have acknowledged that also 
beliefs and ideas play an important role in the policy process, most notably Kingdon (1984) 
and Sabatier (1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). Some consideration for the causal role 
of beliefs and ideas in public policy has also been paid by research works that highlighted the 
importance of argumentation (Majone 1989), discourse (Schmidt 2002, 2010, 2011),   culture 
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(Lodge and Wegrich 2012), and legitimacy (Wang and Ching 2013) on public and regulatory 
policies. 
We need to look at „ideational‟ or „constructivist‟ epistemological perspectives to social 
science in order to find a primary role granted to beliefs and ideas as explanatory sources of 
social phenomena. It should be noted, first, that the very concepts of beliefs and ideas are 
defined in different ways. Beliefs are generally understood as “mental constructions of 
experience, often condensed and integrated into schemata or concepts that are held to be true 
and that guide behavior” (Sigel 1985: 313) or “psychologically held understandings, 
premises, or propositions about the world that are felt to be true” (Richardson 1996: 103). 
Ideas have been variously illustrated, for example, as “theories, conceptual models, norms, 
world views, frames, principled beliefs, and the like” (Campbell 2002: 21), “claims about 
descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain 
actions”, (Parsons 2002: 48), focal points (Goldstein and Keohane 1993), strategic 
constructions (Jabko 2006), narratives (Roe 1994), frames of reference (Jobert 1989), 
collective memories (Rothstein 2005), and traditions (Katzenstein 1996). Some, like 
Campbell (2002) and Schmidt (2010), also drew distinctions between kinds of ideas, such as 
the one between cognitive and normative contents and the one between levels of 
generalizability (i.e., policies, programs, and philosophies). 
It should be noted that also ideational or constructivist approaches to social sciences have 
made relatively little progress to explain how ideas matter in public policy and regulation 
(Yee 1996). Some authors highlighted that ideas form the cognitive basis of „sentient‟ agents 
who reflect upon, debate about, and argue for preserving or changing existing institutional 
arrangements (Fisher and Gottweis 2013; Schmidt 2008, 2010). In this sense, ideas provide 
cognitive paradigms (that include taken-for-granted beliefs; Heilbroner and Milberg 1995) 
and shortcuts (that include heuristics to make sense and solve complex problem situations; 
Suchman  1997)  to  deal  with  policy  issues.  Ideas  also  make  agents  challenge    existing 
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institutions and related patterns of distribution of resources (Béland 2009; Blyth 2001), 
although sometimes they restrict the scope of policy options under consideration (Campbell 
2002). Finally, ideas also help providing rationales for decisions that help justify actions and 
persuade others of the merits of policy options (Béland 2005). 
These general considerations on the role of beliefs and ideas in social science are relevant to 
the study of regulation of water utilities. Ideas on how water services should be provided play 
an important role in orienting the decisions of policy-makers. At the local level, public 
officers (that we understand here as members of the policy community that includes both 
elected public officers as well as appointed or career regulators and managers of public 
utilities) enjoy some discretion in the design of regulatory institutions for the delivery of 
water supply and sanitation services. In France, for example, municipalities can decide 
whether to contract out the provision of water services to business firms selected through 
tender offer competitions or to retain the management of water services within municipal 
departments. Which regulatory system is selected, and whether it is maintained over time or 
substituted with another one, also depends on the role of ideas about the relative merit of 
alternative policy options. For example on some occasions, like the „remunicipalisation‟ of 
water service provision in Grenoble in 2001 and in Paris in 2010, ideas make policy-makers 
contemplate the possibility of regulatory policy reversals in conditions of seemingly stable 
institutional arrangements. 
Ideas on the regulation of water utilities include that water service provision should be 
subjected to economic regulation, especially because of natural monopoly features of water 
infrastructure. This idea is articulated in the shared view, within water policy circles, that 
economies of scale result in advantages for larger operators, that network economies produce 
benefits for the operators of larger infrastructure networks, and that durable and immobile 
assets discourage entry from potential competitors (Araral 2008, 2009, 2013; Gómez Ibáňez 
2003; Estache and Martimort 1999; Laffont and Tirole 1993; Spulberg and Sabbaghi    1994). 
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Relatively less consensus exists, however, on how precisely water utilities should be 
regulated. Ideas include regulating water utilities through independent regulatory authorities 
(IRAs, such as OFWAT in England and Wales), or through franchise contracts (as it is often 
done in France), or through the retention of water services under full public ownership and 
control (as it is often the case in Germany and Italy) or under semi-privatized water utilities 
(i.e., mixed public-private ownership firms or „institutional public-private partnerships‟) 
(Araral and Wang 2013; Ballance and Taylor 2005; Rouse 2007). Ideas also include various 
arrangements regarding the efficiency of water firms, the pursuit of equity values, the 
conditions for the financial self-sufficiency of water services, and the relationships between 
the regulators and the regulated firms. 
Although beliefs and ideas can be granted, in principle, an important role to explain 
regulatory policies, little empirical research exists on what public officers think about water 
utilities regulation. In part, this lack of research may originate from the methodological and 
operational difficulties to access the subjective understandings of individuals. Yet, the 
ideational sphere of public officers on the regulation of water utilities provides an indication 
of the issues that public officers care about, of the different options that they consider 
available to them, and of their normative stance towards alternative ways of regulating water 
services. The ideational sphere of public officers can also contain an anticipation (or „seeds‟, 
in a metaphorical sense) of policy ideas that could gain traction in the policy arena at later 
stage, when appropriate windows of opportunity for policy change occur (Kingdon, 1984). 
An investigation of the beliefs and ideas on water regulation seems important in order to 
appreciate whether public officers hold a variety of views on water regulation or tend to 
adopt a more shared and uniform perspective towards regulatory options. Such an 
investigation is needed if we want to better understand the similarities and differences of the 
water regulatory discourse across different countries and institutional contexts. In addition, 
systematically  mapping  out  beliefs  will  help  facilitate  the  development  of  an alternative 
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regime of regulation such as negotiated rule making. Negotiated rule making is a kind of rule 
making process that includes a negotiation between parties affected by a regulation before the 
issue of a proposed regulation (Coglianese 1997). Negotiated rule making can provide 
substantial benefits such as more efficient rule making, more cost effective enforcement and 
compliance, and more equitable in terms of balancing the interests of stakeholders. When 
applied to water regulation, this alternative regime entails that greater openness about each 
party‟s positions and preferences helps exploring the room for mutually advantageous 
regulations  and prevent conflicts that might arise. 
 
 
3. Research design 
 
This study aims to investigate what are the beliefs and ideas held by public officers on the 
regulation of water utilities. The investigation is intended to describe whether public officers 
share a „hegemonic‟ view of water service regulation or they hold conflicting viewpoints on 
this subject. Answering this research question requires to open up the 'black box' of public 
officers' understanding of water regulatory regimes. Beliefs and ideas have been typically 
accessed through qualitative research methods (Schmidt 2011). There are obviously some 
merits in collecting and analyzing interviews or other qualitative evidence because they 
enable researchers to appreciate the emic perspective of participants to a policy domain. 
However, there are also some limitations to qualitative research because this method fails to 
provide a systematic evidence of what ideas individuals hold, how different or similar ideas 
are between individuals, and how much ideas are shared among the participants of a policy 
domain. We know that some ideas typically play a dominant or hegemonic role within a 
policy arena (Jobert 1989) while other ideas are confined to the background or to the margins 
of the policy discourse (at least, in the public one). If beliefs and ideas matter in the 
regulation of water utilities, we need to resort to enriched methodological tools for gathering 
and analyzing them. 
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This study employs Q Methodology for accessing and analyzing ideas on the regulation of 
water utilities. Q Methodology is a statistical technique that helps identify the patterns of 
subjective perspectives held by a group of individuals (Stephenson 1953; Brown 1980). 
Different from other forms of quantitative research, Q Methodology is not intended to test 
hypothesized causal relationships but to identify „bundles‟ of ideas (in the form of 
statements) shared between individuals. Likewise, Q Methodology differs from various forms 
of qualitative research in that it employs statistical correlations for inferring associations 
between ideas (in the form of statements) rather than exclusively relying on researchers‟ 
interpretation. Interpretation, however, is required to make sense of the results of the analysis, 
especially because ideas need to be understood within the context of policy domain-specific 
political discourses. 
In order to better appreciate the variety of ideas on water regulation that are present within 
domestic political discourses, this study employs – more precisely – a Comparative Q 
Methodology approach. The analysis of the beliefs and ideas held by public officers has to be 
comparative in nature. It is by contrasting and comparing beliefs and ideas between countries 
with different political and institutional contexts that we can draw inferences  about the 
origins of such beliefs and ideas and their tendencies to change over time. The present study, 
then, consists of a comparative analysis of beliefs and ideas on water regulation that are held 
by public officers in two different countries (namely, Italy and China), whose argument for 
selection is illustrated below. The analysis, in this respect, is functional to start addressing 
more general questions about regulatory theory on whether regulations eventually converge 
or diverge. 
The study was conducted by identifying, first, a series of statements (called Q sample) that 
represents that variety of views around the issue at stake (so-called „concourse‟) (Dryzek and 
Berejikian 1993; Dryzek and Holmes 2002; Steelman and Maguire 1995). The Q sample 
employed in this study was constructed in a previous research (Asquer, 2014) on the basis  of 
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a selection of about 150 statements drawn from documentary sources and 20 interviews 
conducted in prior studies (Asquer 2010, 2011). The Q sample, shown in Table 1, consisted 
of 30 statements that describe (a) the normative stance towards values that should be 
protected in the regulation of water utilities; (b) the general regulatory design principles that 
should be followed; (c) initial conditions that characterize the present state of affairs in the 
local water industry; (d) process conditions that relate to features of the regulatory process; 
and (e) context conditions that relate to environmental circumstances. Admittedly, the limited 
number of sentences of the Q sample prevents us from gaining a more detailed and nuanced 
account of the variety of views on the regulation of water utilities. On the other hand, the size 
of the Q sample is constrained by practical considerations for the amount of time and effort 
that participants are willing to spend in the data collection stage. Admittedly the definition of 
the Q sample on the basis of evidence collected from the regulatory discourse in one 
particular country (Italy) raises some concerns about the possibility to map out beliefs and 
ideas on water regulation in another country (China). On the other hand, the Q sample was 
originally designed also taking into account theoretical arguments about fundamental 
regulatory issues that arise irrespective from any particular institutional and political context. 
The second stage of Comparative Q Methodology consisted of the purposive selection of 
participants (called P sample) that were invited to express their degree of agreement with the 
sentences of the Q sample. This study included two P samples, one made of 24 respondents 
in Italy and the other of 68 participants in China. The selection of the two countries is based 
on theoretical and empirical considerations. First, drawing the comparison between relatively 
distant institutional and political contexts helps distinguishing beliefs and ideas that are 
shared in the water sector irrespective of particular country conditions form those that are 
related to particular features of the context. In this respect, Italy and China exhibit some 
remarkable differences. During the past three decades, China experienced a gradual and 
managed  transition  from  centralized  planned  economy  to  a  market-oriented      economy 
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(MacMillan and Naughton 1992; Qian and Weingast 1996). The institutional and political 
context for water regulation, however, remains largely dependent on an extended hierarchy 
that includes the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, and 
several agencies like the Water Resources Bureaus (WRBs) that operate at the provincial, 
prefectural, and country levels and the River Basin Conservation Commissions for China‟s 
main river basins (Qiu and Li, 2008). And the idea of adopting market to allocate water 
resources was spread since 2000 and was accepted by public officers in recent years. 
Although immature water rights market is emerging (Wang, 2012), the water sector is still 
mainly under the regulation of government and the water rights market is still in its infancy. 
Water regulation in Italy, in contrast, followed an erratic trajectory since 1994 – when a 
reform dismantled a regime of widespread public sector ownership and control of water 
utilities – and during the 2000‟s – when various policy measures aimed to stimulate greater 
involvement of private business and capital into the sector (Asquer 2010, 2011, 2014; 
Massarutto et al 2008; Romano and Guerrini 2011). Political support for the privatization of 
water utilities dissolved over time, however. In 2011, a referendum resulted in the abrogation 
of legislative provisions about the tender out of water concessions and the inclusion of a 
return to investment in water tariff. 
Italy and China also share, however, some common threads in the public discourse on water 
regulation. During the last decades, both Italy and China became increasingly exposed to 
neo-liberal ideas that conflicted with principles of public sector ownership and control of 
water services. In Italy, the public discourse polarized around the views that water should be 
privatized because of public sector inefficiencies and those that opposed  privatization 
because of equity and environmental concerns (Massarutto and Ermano, 2013). In China, 
ideas about water regulation came to include a greater role for private financing, together 
with greater consideration of issues related to rapid urbanization, industrialization, growing 
agricultural demand, environmental degradation, and climate change threats (Hu and Wang 
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2000; Zhang et al. 2009). In both countries, also, ideas on water resource management have 
incorporated the principles of integrated river basin management. 
The selection of the participants to the P sample is also based on theoretical and empirical 
considerations. In Q Methodology, participants should provide alternative perspectives on the 
issue at stake. It would be necessary to have ex ante knowledge of individuals‟ viewpoints in 
order to select participants appropriately, but typically it helps to sample individuals who 
hold different positions within the particular social or policy domain of interest. Participants 
to the P sample in Italy were selected among public officers in local governments, namely 
members of municipal assemblies and managers of local government-owned water firms 
from 19 cities. The average (and median) age of the 24 respondents was 45 year old. The 
respondents included 21 male and 3 female. The average (and median) work experience in 
the water sector of the respondents was 5 years (the sample included respondents with work 
experiences raging from 1 to 20 years). Half of respondents declared themselves as having 
political orientation towards „leftist‟ parties (50% of the sample), while others were oriented 
towards „centre‟ (12.5%) and „right‟ parties (20.8%). Only 4 respondents did not report any 
political orientation. Participants to the P sample in China included public officers in charge 
or related to water firms including waterworks or construction bureau or water conservancy 
bureau of the provincial, municipal and county level. While data from the Italian sample were 
collected online following individual emails to public officers in various cities across the 
country, those from the Chinese sample were collected in part during training sessions 
organised in Beijing and Hangzhou by the Ministry of Water Resources and in part by 
sending the questionnaire to specific provinces (Guangxi, Sichuan, Shannxi and Xinjiang). 
Respondents of the Chinese sample were 35 year old an average (mean and median) and  had 
11.5 year work experience (mean and median). 80% of respondents were male and 20% 
female. As the political spectrum that was used for asking the Italian sample about their 
political orientation would be meaningless in the China context, respondents were asked to 
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express their policy orientation towards the attitude that the government should take towards 
water markets. Respondents largely agreed that the government should take a strongly strict 
attitude towards water markets (52.94%) or a strict one (38.24%). A minority agreed with a 
moderate (7.35%) or a loose attitude (1.47%). 
In the third stage of Q Methodology, participants were invited to sort the statements of the Q 
sample into a „grid‟ shaped as a normal distribution (i.e., a pyramid made of „slots‟ arranged 
along a scale ranging from the sentence that any participant agrees the least with, valued -5, 
to the sentence that any participant agrees the most with, valued +5). Sorting was done online 
through FlashQ software (Braehler and Hackert 2013). The grid is intended to make 
participants rank the order in which they agree with the sentences, rather than merely 
expressing the extent to which they agree with them or not (as it is done in questionnaire 
surveys). Finally, the responses (called Q sorts) are analyzed through a by-person factor 
analysis (Stephenson 1953) to reveal correlated groups of statement preferences. Analysis 
was conducted with PQMethod software (Schmolck 2013). The factors that result from the 
analysis can be understood as groups of claims that are related to particular views on the 
regulation and management of water utilities. 
 
 
4. Results from the analysis 
 
Results from the analysis of the data are presented in Tables 2 to 9. The analysis conducted in 
both countries resulted in the identification of five factors. Tables 2 and 3 exhibit the factor 
matrix with defining sorts from the data collected in Italy and China, respectively. These 
tables indicate (in bold) those respondents whose Q sorts contribute defining each particular 
factor. Tables 4 and 5 illustrate factor Q sort values for each statement. These tables indicate 
the rank value that each sentence of the Q sample is given in each particular factor. Tables 6 
and 7 show the correlations between factors. In the analysis conducted in both countries, 
some  factors  are  moderately  correlated  with  each  other  (e.g.,  factors  1  and  2  in   Italy, 
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correlation 0.4999, and factors 1 and 2 in China, correlation 0.3910). Finally, Tables 8 and 9 
present the defining statements for each factor. These tables display what are the sentences 
that each factor – i.e., „view‟ on the topic – mostly agrees and disagrees with. The results 
presented in Tables 8 and 9, therefore, are those offered to the interpretation for 
understanding what local public officers in Italy and in China think of the regulation and 
management of water utilities. 
The results of the analysis show that in both Italy and China local public officers hold a 
diverse and fragmented view on the regulation and management of water utilities. In Italy, we 
distinguish five factors in relation to different views on water regulation. Factor 1 can be 
conveniently labeled as a “public sector interventionist” view of regulation and management 
of water utilities. This view is characterized by stronger agreement with claims such as 
“Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms” (statement 30), 
while it includes rejection for sentences like “Local water services should be provided by 
business firms subjected to the pressure of market competition only” (statement 25). Factor 2 
can be described as a “pessimistic” view on water utilities regulation. This view includes 
agreement, for example, with sentences like “Local public authorities tend to interfere in the 
management of water firms rather than supervising and regulating their conduct”    (statement 
19) and disagreement with claims like “Water firms are provided incentives to operate 
efficiently” (statement 24). Factor 3 can be understood as a “pragmatist” approach because 
the view agrees with statements like “Water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair 
return to capital invested” (statement 3) although it disagrees with claims like local water 
services should be provided by business firms (either subjected to a regulatory agency or to 
the terms and conditions of franchise contracts; statements 26 and 27). Factor 4, instead, 
refers to the view of a “users protector”, who agrees that water services should be managed 
according to principles of solidarity and protection of most vulnerable tariffs (statement 2), 
that water tariff should be kept under the control of public authorities to ensure    affordability 
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(statement 4), and that local public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality 
(statement 10). Finally, Factor 5 illustrates the view of a “fatalist privatizer” that agrees that 
“water services provide an attractive opportunity for private investors” (statement 21) and 
that local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to the discretion of a 
regulatory agency (statement 26) or by mixed public-private ownership firms (statement 28). 
Also in China, each of the five factors is characterized by peculiar traits. Factor 1 is 
illustrative of a “strongly pro-public” view of water services regulation and management. The 
factor includes agreement with sentences that “water infrastructure development should be 
primarily financed by public funds” (statement 6), that “the water sector contains too few 
firms to stimulate any form of competition” (statement 14), and that “the attainment of profit 
bears negative effects on the quality of water services” (statement 15), and disagreement with 
the claim that “water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by user 
charges” (statement 5). Factor 2 can be understood to a “financially conscious” view of water 
service provision, instead: the view includes agreement with the claim that “water 
infrastructure development should be primarily financed by public funds “(statement 6), but 
also that “water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital invested” 
(statement 3) and that “water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to 
ensure affordability” (statement 4). Factor 3 illustrates a “business oriented” view that agrees 
that “water services should be managed according to business principles akin to those of for- 
profit firms” (statement 1) and that “water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair 
return to capital invested” (statement 3), while the view disagrees on regulating water utilities 
through any means but franchises (disagreement with statements 28, 26 and 30). The view 
related to Factor 4 is a “public sector critic”, because – although the view includes agreement 
that “the attainment of profit bears negative effects on the quality of water services” 
(statement 15) – it also agrees with claims that “local public authorities do not possess 
adequate knowledge, competences, and capabilities to regulate the conduct of water firms” 
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(statement 13) and that they “do not adequately monitor service quality” (statement 10). 
Finally, Factor 5 relates to the view of a “private sector critic” who agrees on the claim that 
“water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital invested” (statement 3), 
but also that market forces are ineffective in the water sector because of a lack of “reliable 
and comparable measures to assess the quality of services” (statement 16), of an adequate 
number of “firms to stimulate any form of competition” (statement 14), of ways to “compare 
the quality of the services with those provided by other water firms” (statement 22), and of 
“any serious threat of new entrants into the industry” (statement 20). 
In comparative perspective, the results from the analysis show that the public discourse on 
water regulation in Italy and China includes some remarkable similarities and differences. 
From a normative perspective (statements 1-6), both the Italian and Chinese discourses 
exhibit an agreement (to a greater or lesser extent) with “Water services should be managed 
according to principles of solidarity and of protection of the most vulnerable users” 
(statement 2) and “Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to 
ensure affordability” (statement 4) across all the five views identified in the respective 
country analysis. The Italian discourse, however, includes some divergence across different 
views that are not present in the Chinese discourse. For example, statement 5 “Water 
infrastructure development should be primarily financed by users charges” is relatively 
controversial in Italy because it is supported by view of Factors 3 and 4 but it is strongly 
opposed by the view of Factor 2, while it is relatively consistent in China, where it is opposed 
(to a greater or lesser extent) by the views related to all the five factors. While these results 
can be partially understood in relation to a shared sense of public service role of water 
provision, they also convey the impression of some resistance towards user charges financing 
in China despite recent moves towards introduction of public-private partnerships (PPPs) as 
forms of private sector funding of water infrastructure. 
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Also with respect to process conditions (statements 7-12), it is possible to identify some 
commonalities in the discourses on water regulation in Italy and China. In both the Italian 
and Chinese discourse, participants to the Comparative Q Methodology expressed to 
generally agree (across the five views) with statement 10 “Local public authorities do not 
adequately monitor service quality”. Four out of the five views identified in Italy and China 
also agree with statement 12 “Water firms tend not to innovate and improve the quality of 
services over time”. Among the initial and context conditions where water firms operate 
(statements 13-18 and statements 19-24), there are some strong differences between the 
Italian and Chinese discourses: in China, there is a stronger agreement across views that “The 
water sector contains too few firms to stimulate any form of competition” (statement 14) than 
in Italy, where there is instead a tendency across views to agree that “Water services provide 
an attractive opportunity for private investors” (statement 21) than in China. Both in China 
and Italy, instead, there is a controversy on whether “The attainment of profit bears negative 
effects on the quality of water services” (statement 15) and “Water firms are inherently 
inefficient because they are monopolists” (statement 18). In part, these results suggest that the 
two countries differ – apart from features of the institutional and political context – also in 
industrial and financial conditions. In part, they also suggest that, even in countries that 
exhibit such strong differences like Italy and China, similar issues arise about the efficiency 
and innovativeness of water firms, the effectiveness of monitoring activities, and on the 
effects of the profit motive on service quality. 
Finally, the analysis also shows that in both countries there are similar controversies about 
the design options for water regulation. Beliefs that local water services should be provided 
“by business firms subjected to the pressure of market competition only” (statement 25) and 
“by cooperative firms” (statement 29) is generally opposed by all the views both in China and 
Italy. The design option to have local water services provided by “business firms subjected to 
the  discretion  of  a  regulatory  agency”  (statement  26)  is  also  generally  opposed  in both 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Water Resources Management published by Springer: 
http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11269 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22868/ 
 
 
countries, setting aside the views of “fatalist privatizers” in Italy. Statements “Local water 
services should be provided by business firms subjected to terms and conditions of franchise 
contracts” (No. 27), “Local water services should be provided by mixed public-private 
ownership firms” (No. 28) and “Local water services should be provided by full public 
ownership firms” (No. 30), instead, spark controversies across views in both countries. These 
results suggest that, although Italy and China experience different trajectories in the 
development of water regulatory policies, at present none of them exhibits any sign of a 
„hegemonic‟ discourse on how water services should be regulated – although some options, 
around which controversial views arise, are preferred than others. 
The results from the analysis suggest that local public officers hold a very diverse and 
fragmented view on the regulation of water utilities both in Italy and in China. In both 
country contexts, the views on this topic cannot be easily mapped onto simplistic categories 
of “advocates” and “opponents” of public sector ownership or privatization of water service 
provision. Rather, local public officers hold nuanced understandings of water utilities 
regulation. These understandings include some positions about ownership structures and 
regulatory mechanisms, but they also address issues related to tariff principles, investment 
funding, organizational capabilities, and equity. In both countries, ideas on the regulation of 
water utilities seem unlikely to converge towards any unified or shared view. Most likely, 
conflictive policy perspectives will remain part of the political controversy that characterizes 
the water sector, despite of the apparent stability of water institutions. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper introduced the use of the Comparative Q Methodology to systematically map out 
and compare the beliefs of utilities regulators and managers. We tested this methodology 
using survey data from total 92 public officers from several cities in China and Italy. We 
found similarities as well as differences in the beliefs and ideas held by the participants to the 
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Comparative Q Methodology. In both Italy and China, respondents agreed on the importance 
of solidarity, protection of the most vulnerable users, and affordability of water services. 
They also largely agreed that public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality and 
that water firms tend not to innovate and improve service quality. In both countries, 
moreover, there are fragmented views on whether water services should be provided by 
business firms subjected to franchise contracts, mixed public-private ownership firms, or full 
public ownership firms. On the other hand, Italy and China exhibit divergent views on many 
respects. Funding infrastructure development by user charges is opposed in China, while it is 
a matter of controversy in Italy. Chinese respondents hold the pessimistic view that the water 
sector contains too few firms to stimulate any form of competition, while Italian respondents 
believe that water services provide an attractive opportunity for private investors. 
These results may be understood in relation to the „ongoing transition‟ that both countries 
experience, since a few decades, from a regime of widespread public ownership and control 
of water utilities to another regime where neo-liberal ideas (i.e., about the merits of 
privatization and business-like principles of water resources management) have entered the 
water policy domain. If ideas matter in the policy process, then such variety of perspectives 
on water utilities regulation suggests that water policy in these countries has not really settled 
in shared institutional arrangements yet. Rather, ideas that are present in the water policy 
discourse may contain the seeds of further adjustments to regulatory arrangements and 
managerial practices. The identification of such ideas helps anticipating future developments 
of the regulatory institutions and policies in both countries. 
This study also includes some evidence about the method to access and analyze ideas in the 
water policy domain in comparative perspective. Ideas can play an important role in the water 
sector as in any policy domain: for example, beliefs about the desirability of alternative 
regulatory systems or opinions about the regulation of tariffs can have important 
repercussions on the search for efficiency improvements and innovation in technical and 
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managerial tools. This study showed that Comparative Q Methodology provides a systematic 
way to identify viewpoints on the regulation of water utilities. When used in comparative 
perspective, the method can also help identifying similarities and differences in the ideas held 
across different country contexts. This contribution seems important, especially for the sake 
of examining the diffusion of policy ideas (e.g., neo-liberal principles in the regulation and 
management of water resources) across countries and regions in the world. 
Our findings have several implications. First, the beliefs and ideas of public officers have 
implications for the design and enforcement of regulations. Second, the Comparative Q 
Methodology is a useful tool for systematically mapping out the beliefs of regulators and 
managers. Finally, systematically mapping out beliefs and ideas will help facilitate the 
development of an alternative regime of regulation such as negotiated rule making. 
Negotiated rule making is reputed to help attain a more efficient rule making process, more 
cost effective in terms of enforcement and compliance, more equitable in terms of balancing 
the interests of stakeholders and other benefits. Parties of negotiated rule making, however, 
need to approach the process with openness about each party‟s positions and preferences. 
This study showed that Q Methodology provides evidence of those issues that public officers 
in the water sector consider more salient and of their policy inclinations. Such information 
helps exploring how regulations should be drafted in order to deliver mutual advantages to 
parties involved. It can also help anticipating possible sources of conflict between parties and 
suggesting ways to prevent them. Comparative Q methodology offers a systematic way to 
build the foundations of this alternative regime of regulations. 
This study has some limitations that should be acknowledged. The research design included 
the use of a Q sample whose sentences were theoretically derived, while in principle the 
concourse could be also obtained from evidence of the local political discourse. The same Q 
sample, therefore, might not fully capture the detailed and nuanced understanding of 
regulatory and managerial issues of public officers in Italy and China. The use of the same  Q 
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sample for the research conducted in both country contexts, however, is justified by the 
possibility to contrast and compare the views held by officers in the two countries. Another 
limitation is that the results of the analysis are silent with respect to the more fundamental 
issue of how exactly ideas matter in water utilities regulation. Additional research is needed, 
in this respect, to explain how ideas enter the policy discourse and might ultimately affect 
regulatory policy and managerial decisions. 
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Table 1. The Q sample 
 
 
 
Normative 
stance 
Process 
conditions 
Initial 
conditions 
Context 
conditions 
Design 
principles 
 
 
 
 
s1. Water 
services should 
be managed 
according to 
managerial 
principles akin to 
those of for-­­ 
profit firms. 
 
s7. Local public 
authorities care 
more about 
protecting the 
interests of water 
firms than of the 
users. 
s13. Local public 
authorities do 
not possess 
adequate 
knowledge, 
competences, 
and capabilities 
to regulate the 
conduct of water 
firms. 
s19. Local public 
authorities tend 
to interfere in the 
management of 
water firms 
rather than 
supervising and 
regulating their 
conduct. 
 
s25. Local water 
services should 
be provided by 
business firms 
subjected to the 
pressure of 
market 
competition only. 
 
 
 
s2. Water 
services should 
be managed 
according to 
principles of 
solidarity and of 
protection of the 
most vulnerable 
users. 
 
s8. In the tender 
offer of franchise 
contracts, water 
firms tend to 
collude rather 
than compete. 
 
s14. The water 
sector contains 
too few firms to 
stimulate any 
form of 
competition. 
 
s20. Water firms 
are not exposed 
to any serious 
threat of new 
entrants into the 
industry. 
s26. Local water 
services should 
be provided by 
business firms 
subjected to the 
discretion of a 
regulatory 
agency. 
 
 
 
 
 
s3. Water tariffs 
should cover full 
cost, including a 
fair return to 
capital invested. 
s9. If water 
services are 
provided by 
franchisees, 
water firms tend 
not to completely 
comply with 
contractual 
obligations. 
 
s15. The 
attainment of 
profit bears 
negative effects 
on the quality of 
water services. 
 
 
s21. Water 
services provide 
an attractive 
opportunity for 
private investors. 
s27. Local water 
services should 
be provided by 
business firms 
subjected to 
terms and 
conditions of 
franchise 
contracts. 
 
 
 
s4. Water tariffs 
should be kept 
under the 
control of 
public 
authorities to 
ensure 
affordability. 
 
s10. Local public 
authorities do 
not adequately 
monitor service 
quality. 
s16. In the water 
sector we lack 
reliable and 
comparable 
measures to 
assess the quality 
of services. 
s22. Users of water 
services are not 
able to compare 
the quality of the 
services with those 
provided by other 
water firms. 
 
s28. Local water 
services should 
be provided by 
mixed public-­­ 
private 
ownership firms. 
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s5. Water 
infrastructure 
development 
should be 
primarily 
financed by 
users charges. 
s11. 
Renegotiation of 
water franchise 
contracts is 
highly 
demanding in 
terms of time and 
resources. 
s17. In the tender 
offer of franchise 
contracts, it is 
difficult to detail 
and enforce 
contractual 
terms and 
conditions. 
s23. The 
administrative 
judicial system 
plays an important 
role in the 
regulation of water 
firms. 
 
s29. Local water 
services should 
be provided by 
cooperative 
firms. 
 
 
 
s6. Water 
infrastructure 
development 
should be 
primarily 
financed by 
public funds. 
s12. Water firms 
tend not to 
innovate and 
improve the 
quality of 
services over 
time. 
 
s18. Water firms 
are inherently 
inefficient 
because they are 
monopolists. 
 
s24. Water firms 
are provided 
incentives to 
operate efficiently. 
 
s30. Local water 
services should 
be provided by 
full public 
ownership firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Factor matrix with defining sorts (in bold): Italian context 
 
 
Respond 
 
Respond Factors 
 
ent No. ent ID 1 2 3 4 5 
1 CR1 0.3066 −0.0665 0.5351 0.1606 −0.1501 
2 CL1 0.3117 0.3461 0.4480 0.1291 −0.5067 
3 CL2 0.0652 0.1304 0.6083 0.2813 0.1059 
4 C1 0.2396 −0.1540 0.6836 0.2407 −0.1217 
5 LF1 0.3565 0.6346 0.3367 0.2255 0.0480 
6 CL3 −0.0560 0.0601 0.1556 0.0163 0.1611 
7 RT1 0.3671 0.7639 0.0070 0.0214 0.0446 
8 LF2 0.6273 0.1554 0.3089 −0.0863 −0.0713 
9 C2 0.0481 0.2961 −0.0507 0.0444 0.9027 
10 OT1 0.2153 0.0798 0.1132 0.6495 0.1094 
11 LF3 0.7898 0.1444 0.1440 −0.0324 −0.1707 
12 OT2 0.7237 0.1412 0.0435 0.0708 −0.2788 
13 CR1 −0.2277 0.0515 0.0391 0.0688 0.4265 
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14 OT3 0.8053 0.3106 0.1547 0.1055 0.0945 
15 LF4 −0.4282 −0.0336 0.1534 0.3831 0.2295 
16 OT4 0.8039 0.1200 0.1104 0.1356 0.0284 
17 CL4 −0.1263 −0.3549 0.2376 0.0078 −0.3511 
18 RT2 0.0516 0.4528 −0.2500 0.1721 0.0091 
19 CR2 0.2216 0.5558 0.1123 0.0046 0.2062 
20 LF5 0.8065 0.0361 0.2702 0.1859 −0.0893 
21 C3 0.1647 0.1793 0.4189 −0.1098 0.0299 
22 CR3 0.2585 −0.1208 −0.0058 0.3498 −0.1032 
23 CL5 0.7229 -­­0.1483 −0.1830 0.2606 −0.0427 
24 CL6 0.1023 0.1816 0.2093 0.4434 −0.0443 
% explained variance 21 9 9 5 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Factor matrix with defining sorts (in bold): Chinese context 
 
 
Respond 
 
Respond Factors 
 
ent No. ent ID 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0201 -­­0.6315 0.4222 0.0051 -­­0.1947 -­­0.0482 
2 0202 0.0575 0.6416 0.2505 0.0540 0.1553 
3 0203 -­­0.3478 0.6530 -­­0.2165 -­­0.0795 0.0637 
4 0204 -­­0.0837 0.3034 -­­0.3846 0.1414 0.4382 
5 0303 0.1210 0.7557 0.0582 -­­0.0436 0.0001 
6 0304 0.1210 0.7557 0.0582 -­­0.0436 0.0001 
7 0501 0.4010 0.7311 0.1910 0.0737 0.0735 
8 0502 0.5174 0.2727 -­­0.1281 0.2042 -­­0.1613 
9 0503 0.3567 0.4993 0.0749 0.0147 0.2175 
10 0505 0.5221 0.2080 0.1968 -­­0.0269 0.1894 
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11 0506 0.8047 0.2681 0.0931 -­­0.0465 0.1515 
12 0507 0.6264 0.1717 0.4180 0.0505 -­­0.0221 
13 0510 0.1508 0.3303 0.5713 -­­0.1568 -­­0.1318 
14 0511 0.1007 0.1840 -­­0.3358 -­­0.1622 0.1222 
15 0512 0.7858 -­­0.0966 0.2596 -­­0.0180 0.0299 
16 0513 0.4047 0.7443 0.1092 0.0896 0.1487 
17 0514 0.3451 0.4385 -­­0.4726 0.4224 -­­0.0554 
18 0515 0.3854 0.2678 -­­0.1643 -­­0.4649 0.3819 
19 0516 -­­0.0228 0.1024 0.2335 0.4018 0.4785 
20 0517 0.6765 0.4613 -­­0.1332 -­­0.1516 0.1343 
21 0518 0.0554 0.2837 -­­0.0005 0.0296 0.2034 
22 0521 0.6831 0.3207 -­­0.3286 -­­0.0222 -­­0.0743 
23 0522 0.6661 0.1374 0.0468 0.0527 -­­0.1873 
24 0602 0.5000 -­­0.0081 0.4239 0.2121 0.1767 
25 0604 0.1169 -­­0.1930 -­­0.0358 -­­0.1223 0.4814 
26 0606 0.6223 0.3067 -­­0.1440 0.3569 -­­0.1436 
27 0611 -­­0.2931 0.2009 -­­0.0092 -­­0.6174 -­­0.1362 
28 0612 0.0501 0.1209 0-­­5958 -­­0.1994 0-­­5026 
29 0613 -­­0.2116 0.5977 0.3335 0.0136 0.2402 
30 0617 0.3828 0.4193 0.3707 -­­0.0732 0.1343 
31 0618 0.0183 0.0915 0.1062 0.1641 0.5659 
32 0619 0.1940 0.1944 -­­0.0592 -­­0.1212 0.5545 
33 0622 0.5917 0.2157 0.0635 -­­0.1929 -­­0.0622 
34 0623 0.0815 -­­0.0707 0.6549 0.0584 0.1210 
35 0624 0.2860 0.4124 0.2170 -­­0.0115 0.3410 
36 0627 0.3333 0.0739 -­­0.0303 0.0333 0.6167 
37 0631 -­­0.0543 0.3504 -­­0.1870 -­­0.4061 0.5587 
38 0633 0.2234 0.2126 0.2981 0.3555 0.2384 
39 0634 0.1146 0.2879 0.2040 0.2729 -­­0.4336 
40 0635 0.0492 0.1204 0.6548 0.1519 -­­0.0939 
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41 0637 0.1039 -­­0.0280 -­­0.0122 -­­0.5210  0.1974 
42 0640 0.2359 0.5828 -­­0.1220 0.2113  -­­0.0976 
43 0642 0.6062 -­­0.1940 0.2493 -­­0.0419  -­­0.1026 
44 0643 0.6808 0.2934 0.0662 0.1666  0.0852 
45 0645 0.0357 -­­0.0799 0.4049 0.0722  0.4938 
46 0648 0.5059 -­­0.2640 0.0865 0.1104  0.0025 
47 0649 0.3865 0.3346 -­­0.0931 -­­0.2376  0.2278 
48 0651 0.1714 0.4480 -­­0.0482 -­­0.1910  0.4533 
49 0652 0.6609 0.0095 0.0604 0.1883  0.1832 
50 0654 0.3537 0.1214 0.2462 -­­0.0828  0.3579 
51 0901 0.3967 0.1641 0.3242 0.2361  0.3267 
52 0903 -­­0.1635 0.3038 0.2321 0.0425  0.7323 
53 0908 0.6826 0.1095 -­­0.1297 0.0344  0.2235 
54 0911 -­­0.1750 0.1304 -­­0.0971 -­­0.1028  0.5636 
55 0915 0.2958 0.5263 0.0494 0.2682  0.1622 
56 0916 0.5462 0.2465 0.4334 0.2831  0.3494 
57 0918 0.3356 0.2525 -­­0.2157 0.0355  0.2331 
58 1001 0.2362 0.5269 0.0440 0.5545  0.1815 
59 1002 0.5913 0.1403 -­­0.1302 0.1703  0.2169 
60 1005 0.0908 0.1787 -­­0.1154 -­­0.5515  0.4690 
61 1010 -­­0.2078 0.5675 -­­0.0407 -­­0.044  -­­0.0731 
62 1012 0.6047 -­­0.0161 0.1214 -­­0.2924  0.1978 
63 1014 0.3226 0.4979 0.0080 -­­0.0628  0.3477 
64 1016 0.6042 -­­0.0697 0.1694 -­­0.0840  -­­0.1540 
65 1018 0.2843 -­­0.1105 0.3826 -­­0.0137  0.0963 
66 1019 -­­0.0115 0.3598 -­­0.1099 -­­0.1011  0.1728 
67 1023 -­­0.0350 0.2758 0.4472 0.1335  -­­0.2257 
68 1028 0.3955 0.2403 0.5685 0.5417  -­­0.0252 
% explained variance 16 13 7 5 8 
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Table 4. Factor Q sort values for each statement: Italian context 
 
 
 
Statements 
Factors 
 
 
1 Water services should be managed according to business principles 
akin to those of for-­­profit firms. 
 
 
2 Water services should be managed according to principles of 
solidarity and of protection of the most vulnerable users. 
 
 
3 Water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital 
invested. 
 
 
4 Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities 
to ensure affordability. 
 
 
5 Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
users charges. 
 
 
6 Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
public funds. 
 
 
7 Local public authorities care more about protecting the interests of 
water firms than of the users. 
 
 
8 In the tender offer of franchise contracts, water firms tend to 
collude rather than compete. 
 
 
9 If water services are provided by franchisees, water firms tend not 
to completely comply with contractual obligations. 
 
 
10 Local public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality. 
 
 
11 Renegotiation of water franchise contracts is highly demanding in 
terms of time and resources. 
 
 
12 Water firms tend not to innovate and improve the quality of 
services over time. 
 
 
13 Local public authorities do not possess adequate knowledge, 
competences, and capabilities to regulate the conduct of water 
firms. 
 
 
14 The water sector contains too few firms to stimulate any form of 
competition. 
 
 
15 The attainment of profit bears negative effects on the quality of 
water services. 
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16 In the water sector we lack reliable and comparable measures to 
assess the quality of services. 
−1   −1 1 3 2
 
 
 
17 In the tender offer of franchise contracts, it is difficult to detail and 
enforce contractual terms and conditions. 
 
 
18 Water firms are inherently inefficient because they are monopolists. 
 
 
19 Local public authorities tend to interfere in the management of 
water firms rather than supervising and regulating their conduct. 
 
 
20 Water firms are not exposed to any serious threat of new entrants 
into the industry. 
 
 
21 Water services provide an attractive opportunity for private 
investors. 
 
 
22 Users of water services are not able to compare the quality of the 
services with those provided by other water firms. 
 
 
23 The administrative judicial system plays an important role in the 
regulation of water firms. 
 
 
24 Water firms are provided incentives to operate efficiently. 
 
 
25 Local water services should be provided by business firms 
subjected to the pressure of market competition only. 
 
 
26 Local water services should be provided by business firms 
subjected to the discretion of a regulatory agency. 
 
 
27 Local water services should be provided by business firms 
subjected to terms and conditions of franchise contracts. 
 
 
28 Local water services should be provided by mixed public-­­private 
ownership firms. 
 
 
29 Local water services should be provided by cooperative firms. 
 
 
30 Local water services should be provided by full public ownership 
firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Factor Q sort values for each statement: Chinese context 
 
 
 
Statements 
Factors 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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1 Water services should be managed according to business principles 
akin to those of for-­­profit firms. 
-­­4 -­­2 5 0 0
 
 
 
2 Water services should be managed according to principles of 
solidarity and of protection of the most vulnerable users. 
1 3 3 2 2
 
 
 
3 Water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital 
invested. 
-­­2 4 4 1 5
 
 
 
4 Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities 
to ensure affordability. 
2 4 1 2 3
 
 
 
5 Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
users charges. 
-­­5 -­­5 -­­1 -­­1 -­­4
 
 
 
6 Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
public funds. 
5 5 2 -­­1 -­­4
 
 
 
7 Local public authorities care more about protecting the interests of 
water firms than of the users. 
0 -­­1 2 1 -­­5
 
 
 
8 In the tender offer of franchise contracts, water firms tend to 
collude rather than compete. 
0 -­­1 2 1 -­­5
 
 
 
9 If water services are provided by franchisees, water firms tend not 
to completely comply with contractual obligations. 
 
 
10 Local public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality. 
 
 
11 Renegotiation of water franchise contracts is highly demanding in 
terms of time and resources. 
 
 
12 Water firms tend not to innovate and improve the quality of 
services over time. 
 
 
13 Local public authorities do not possess adequate knowledge, 
competences, and capabilities to regulate the conduct of water 
firms. 
 
 
14 The water sector contains too few firms to stimulate any form of 
competition. 
 
 
15 The attainment of profit bears negative effects on the quality of 
water services. 
 
 
16 In the water sector we lack reliable and comparable measures to 
assess the quality of services. 
 
 
17 In the tender offer of franchise contracts, it is difficult to detail and 
enforce contractual terms and conditions. 
 
 
18 Water firms are inherently inefficient because they are monopolists. 
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19 Local public authorities tend to interfere in the management of 
water firms rather than supervising and regulating their conduct. 
-­­1 1 1 -­­2 -­­1
 
 
 
20 Water firms are not exposed to any serious threat of new entrants 
into the industry. 
 
 
21 Water services provide an attractive opportunity for private 
investors. 
 
 
22 Users of water services are not able to compare the quality of the 
services with those provided by other water firms. 
 
 
23 The administrative judicial system plays an important role in the 
regulation of water firms. 
 
 
24 Water firms are provided incentives to operate efficiently. 
 
 
25 Local water services should be provided by business firms 
subjected to the pressure of market competition only. 
 
 
26 Local water services should be provided by business firms 
subjected to the discretion of a regulatory agency. 
 
 
27 Local water services should be provided by business firms 
subjected to terms and conditions of franchise contracts. 
 
 
28 Local water services should be provided by mixed public-­­private 
ownership firms. 
 
 
29 Local water services should be provided by cooperative firms. 
 
 
30 Local water services should be provided by full public ownership 
firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Correlations between factor scores: Italian context 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 0.4999 0.3761 0.3301 −0.0263 
2 0.4999 1 0.2324 0.2891 0.2852 
3 0.3761 0.2324 1 0.3693 0.0118 
4 0.3301 0.2891 0.3693 1 0.1430 
5 −0.0263 0.2852 0.0118 0.1430 1 
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Table 7. Correlations between factor scores: Chinese context 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 0.3910 0.2371 0.1316 0.1758 
2 0.3910 1 0.2085 0.0562 0.3386 
3 0.2371 0.2085 1 0.1543 0.1721 
4 0.1316 0.0562 0.1543 1 -­­0.1698 
5 0.1758 0.3386 0.1721 -­­0.1698 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Defining statements for each factor (Z-scores > 1 or < −1): Italian context 
 
 
Factor No. 1 Rank Z-­­score 
 
 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
s3 
0 
Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms.   5 2.249 
s2 
Water services should be managed according to principles of solidarity 
and of protection of the most vulnerable users. 
 
s4 
Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to 
ensure affordability. 
 
s1 The attainment of profit bears negative effects on the quality of water 
5 services. 
s2 
1 
Water services provide an attractive opportunity for private investors. 3 1.026 
 
 
Disagrees especially 
with the following 
statements 
 
 
s2 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
6 the discretion of a regulatory agency. 
−3 −1.341
 
4 1.578 
4 1.499 
 
3 
 
1.235 
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s2 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
7 terms and conditions of franchise contracts. 
−4 −1.435
 
 
Water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital 
invested. 
−4 −1.686
 
 
s2 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
5 the pressure of market competition only. 
−5 −1.894
 
 
 
Factor No. 2 
 
 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
s1 The attainment of profit bears negative effects on the quality of water 
5 services. 
5 1.592
 
s1 Local public authorities tend to interfere in the management of water 
9 firms rather than supervising and regulating their conduct. 
4 1.546
 
s3 
0 
s1 
0 
s2 
1 
s1 Local public authorities do not possess adequate knowledge, 
3 competences, and capabilities to regulate the conduct of water firms. 
3 1.052
 
 
 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
s2 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
5 the pressure of market competition only. 
−3 −1.538
 
 
Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
users charges. 
−4 −1.592
 
 
s2 
4 
s2 
9 
 
 
Factor No. 3 
 
 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
Water services should be managed according to principles of solidarity 
and of protection of the most vulnerable users. 
Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to 
ensure affordability. 
Water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital 
invested. 
 
 
s3 
s5 
s2 
s4 
s3 
Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms. 4 1.446 
 
Local public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality. 
 
3 
 
1.199 
Water services provide an attractive opportunity for private investors. 3 1.152 
 
Water firms are provided incentives to operate efficiently. −4 −1.848 
Local water services should be provided by cooperative firms. −5 −1.894 
 
 
5 
 
1.896 
 
4 
 
1.809 
4 1.494 
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s1 
 
 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
s2 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
7 terms and conditions of franchise contracts. 
−4 −1.653
 
 
Local public authorities care more about protecting the interests of 
water firms than of the users. 
−4 −1.735
 
 
s2 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
5 the pressure of market competition only. 
5 −2.367
 
 
 
Factor No. 4 
 
 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
Water services should be managed according to principles of solidarity 
and of protection of the most vulnerable users. 
5 2.287
 
Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to 
ensure affordability. 
4 1.679
 
 
s1 
0 
Local public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality. 4 1.378 
Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
users charges. 
3 1.071
 
 
s1 In the water sector we lack reliable and comparable measures to assess 
6 the quality of services. 
3 1.071
 
 
 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
If water services are provided by franchisees, water firms tend not to 
completely comply with contractual obligations. 
−3 −1.523
 
 
s2 
9 
Local water services should be provided by cooperative firms. −4 −1.528 
s1 
8 
Water firms are inherently inefficient because they are monopolists. −4 −1.679 
Water services should be managed according to business principles 
akin to those of for-­­profit firms. 
−5 −1.986
 
 
 
Factor No. 5 
 
 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
s2 Local water services should be provided by mixed public-­­private 
8 ownership firms. 
5 1.923
 
s2 
1 
Water services provide an attractive opportunity for private investors. 4 1.406 
 
s2 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
6 the discretion of a regulatory agency. 
4 1.406
 
s7 
s2 
s4 
s5 
s9 
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s2 Water firms are not exposed to any serious threat of new entrants into 
0 the industry. 
3 1.162
 
s1 Local public authorities do not possess adequate knowledge, 
3 competences, and capabilities to regulate the conduct of water firms. 
3 1.123
 
 
Local public authorities care more about protecting the interests of 
water firms than of the users. 
3 1.084
 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
s2 
4 Water firms are provided incentives to operate efficiently. −3 −1.162 
 
s2 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
5 the pressure of market competition only. 
−3 −1.201
 
s3 
0 
Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms.   −3 −1.201 
 
s1 Renegotiation of water franchise contracts is highly demanding in 
1 terms of time and resources. 
−4 −1.366
 
s2 
9 
Local water services should be provided by cooperative firms. −4 −1.601 
 
s2 The administrative judicial system plays an important role in the 
3 regulation of water firms. 
−5 −1.923
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Defining statements for each factor (Z-scores > 1 or < −1): Chinese context 
 
 
Z 
 
 
Factor No. 1 Rank 
 
 
 
 
 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
public funds. 
5 1.686
 
The water sector contains too few firms to stimulate any form of 
competition. 
4 1.282
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s25 
s16 
 
The attainment of profit bears negative effects on the quality of water 
services. 
4 1.250
 
s10 Local public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality. 3 1.041 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
users charges. 
-­­5 -­­2.074
 
Water services should be managed according to business principles 
s1 akin to those of 
for-­­profit firms. 
-­­4 -­­1.953 
 
s24 Water firms are provided incentives to operate efficiently. -­­4 -­­1.505 
 
s25 
Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
the discretion of a regulatory agency. 
 
 
Factor No. 2 
 
 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
s6 
Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
public funds. 
 
s4 
Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to 
ensure affordability. 
 
s3 
Water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital 
invested. 
Water services should be managed according to principles of solidarity 
and of protection of the most vulnerable users. 
3 1.307
 
s30 Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms.   3 1.069 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
users charges. 
-­­5 -­­2.329
 
Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
the pressure of market competition only. 
-­­4 -­­1.114
 
s29 Local water services should be provided by cooperative firms. -­­4 -­­1.047 
In the water sector we lack reliable and comparable measures to assess 
the quality of services. 
-­­3 -­­1.007
 
 
 
Factor No. 3 
 
 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
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5 
 
1.971 
 
4 
 
1.681 
4 1.645 
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s2 
s26 
s12 
 
 
Water services should be managed according to business principles 
s1 akin to those of 
for-­­profit firms. 
 
5 2.350 
 
Water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital 
invested. 
4 1.701
 
The water sector contains too few firms to stimulate any form of 
competition. 
4 1.257
 
In the water sector we lack reliable and comparable measures to assess 
the quality of services. 
3 1.129
 
Water services should be managed according to principles of solidarity 
and of protection of the most vulnerable users. 
3 1.092
 
 
 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
The administrative judicial system plays an important role in the 
regulation of water firms. 
-­­5 -­­1.878
 
Local water services should be provided by mixed public-­­private 
ownership firms. 
-­­4 -­­1.736
 
Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
the discretion of a regulatory agency. 
-­­4 -­­1.624
 
s30 Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms.    -­­3 -­­1.140 
 
s24 Water firms are provided incentives to operate efficiently. -­­3 -­­1.106 
 
 
Factor No. 4 
 
 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
The attainment of profit bears negative effects on the quality of water 
services. 
5 1.901
 
Local public authorities do not possess adequate knowledge, 
competences, and capabilities to regulate the conduct of water firms. 
4 1.476
 
s10 Local public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality. 4 1.462 
s30 Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms.   3 1.278 
Water firms tend not to innovate and improve the quality of services 
over time. 
3 1.107
 
Local water services should be provided by mixed public-­­private 
ownership firms. 
3 1.072
 
 
 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
the pressure of market competition only. 
-­­5 -­­2.050
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s27 
 
Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
the discretion of a regulatory agency. 
-­­4 -­­1.991
 
Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to 
terms and conditions of franchise contracts. 
-­­4 -­­1.660
 
s18 Water firms are inherently inefficient because they are monopolists. -­­3 -­­1.235 
 
 
Factor No. 5 
 
 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
Water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital 
invested. 
5 1.882
 
In the water sector we lack reliable and comparable measures to assess 
the quality of services. 
4 1.571
 
The water sector contains too few firms to stimulate any form of 
competition. 
4 1.502
 
Users of water services are not able to compare the quality of the 
services with those provided by other water firms. 
3 1.460
 
Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to 
ensure affordability. 
3 1.184
 
Water firms are not exposed to any serious threat of new entrants into 
the industry. 
3 1.154
 
 
 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
 
 
Local public authorities care more about protecting the interests of 
water firms than of the users. 
-­­5 -­­2.062
 
Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
public funds. 
-­­4 -­­1.448
 
Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by 
users charges. 
-­­4 -­­1.397
 
s30 Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms.    -­­3 -­­1.283 
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